Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation by Lipton, Ann M.
175 
FAMILY LOYALTY: MUTUAL FUND VOTING AND 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION 
Ann M. Lipton∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, institutional investors have increasingly come to dominate the market 
for publicly-traded stock.  Mutual funds have become especially important, controlling 
trillions of dollars of corporate equity. 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has made it clear 
that it is the fiduciary responsibility of fund administrators to vote their shares in a 
manner that benefits investors in the fund.  Sponsoring companies have responded by 
creating centralized research offices that determine the voting policies across all the 
funds they administer.  Though there may be some variation at the individual fund 
level, most fund families vote as a block. 
The practice of centralized voting raises the question whether each fund is promoting 
the best interests of its investors.  For example, one fund may hold stock in an acqui-
sition target, while another holds stock in the acquirer; one fund may hold stock in a 
target, while another holds debt.  These funds have different interests, but voting poli-
cies rarely differentiate among them. 
This Essay argues that mutual fund boards should develop procedures to ensure that 
fund shares are voted with a view toward advancing the best interests of that particular 
fund.  If such procedures cannot be implemented in a manner that justifies their costs, 
funds should refrain from voting their shares at all. 
In addition to benefitting fund investors, this proposal may also have a salu-
tary effect on portfolio firms.  In recent years, commenters have expressed concern about 
the voting power exerted by mutual fund managers, who may pressure firms to avoid 
competition within an industry or who may encourage short-term financial engineering 
over long-term growth.  Decentralization may diminish asset managers’ power, thereby 
alleviating these effects. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds have dramatically changed the way that Americans 
invest.  In 1998, registered investment companies controlled $5.8 trillion 
in assets; today, that figure has reached nearly $20 trillion.1  In 1980, 
three percent of American households’ financial assets were invested in 
mutual funds; today, mutual funds hold twenty-two percent of house-
hold financial assets.2  Ninety-four million U.S. individual investors own 
mutual funds, either directly or through a retirement account, represent-
ing nearly forty-four percent of all U.S. households.3 
Though there are thousands of mutual funds and investment 
managers registered with the SEC,4 the industry is in fact dominated by 
financial conglomerates that may each sponsor hundreds of funds, repre-
senting trillions of dollars in assets under control of a single umbrella 
manager.5  Conflicts among client funds are both inevitable and ubiqui-
tous, resulting in a variety of regulatory responses.  Chief among these 
are the basic fiduciary duties that each investment adviser and mutual 
fund board of directors owes to the fund: the duties of care and loyalty.6  
The SEC has also promulgated a number of specific rules aimed at en-
                                                 
1 Inv. Co. Inst., 2017 Investment Company Fact Book 9 (57th ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
“ICI Fact Book”]. 
2 ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 11. 
3 ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 112. 
4 Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Structure of Investment Management Regulation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle, eds.) (Elgar 
Publishing, forthcoming) (reporting 11,500 SEC-registered investment managers as of 
January 2015); ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 16, 22 (reporting 850 sponsors and over 
16 thousand registered investment companies as of 2016). 
5 See, e.g., Sarah Krouse, ‘Passive’ Investing Frenzy Pushes Vanguard to $4.7 Trillion in Assets, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/amp/ articles/passive-
investing-frenzy-pushes-vanguard-to-4-7-trillion-in-assets-1507671188; see also Black-
Rock Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2017) (reporting $5.1 trillion in assets un-
der management). 
6 See Investment Company Governance, Exchange Act Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 
2004) (“the paramount principle that must prevail, and should animate all decisions 
directors are called upon to make, is that a fund must be managed on behalf of its in-
vestors”). 
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suring that advisers develop investment policies and execute orders in a 
manner that advances the fund’s best interests. 
What has received less attention is conflicts among funds when it 
comes to voting.  Mutual funds that hold equity investments are entitled 
to vote their shares, but funds may stand on opposite sides of a merger, 
hold investments in competing companies, or have different time hori-
zons for their investments.  As a result, they are likely to have varying 
preferences.  Notwithstanding this fact, it is common for advisers to cen-
tralize and coordinate their voting decisions.  The practice is well known 
and, indeed, publicized, but has attracted little regulatory attention de-
spite the fact that in many instances, votes may be cast in a way that does 
not advance—and indeed may harm—individual fund interests. 
The issue takes on a particular significance given the extraordi-
nary voting power exercised by mutual fund families.  As one comment-
er explained, “When one looks at the shareholder registry of a typical 
company, there are six names that come up repeatedly.  These are 
Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, Fidelity, BNY Mellon Investment 
Management and Capital Group.”7  The dominance of a handful of asset 
managers has been described as “a concentration of corporate owner-
ship, not seen since the days of J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller.”8  Co-
ordination among funds dramatically increases each asset manager’s lev-
erage, with all of the benefits to portfolio companies—as well as pit-
falls—that follow.   
As a result, this Essay argues that the common practice of coor-
dinated voting among mutual fund families should be reconsidered.  
Fund boards should carefully examine whether funds are served by ad-
hering to a centralized governance strategy, and, if not, insist that indi-
vidual funds vote their shares separately.  In some cases, fund boards 
may conclude that without centralization, it is not cost-effective to vote a 
particular fund’s shares at all; if so, abstaining would be preferable to 
                                                 
7 Patrick Jahnke, Voice versus Exit: The causes and consequence of increasing shareholder concentra-
tion 9 (Sept. 18, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=3027058. 
8 Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden power of the Big Three?: Passive index funds, re-concentration of corpo-
rate ownership, and new financial risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 315 (2017). 
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causing the fund to cast votes that do not advance the fund’s interests.  
These changes will improve fund administration, ensure that votes are 
cast in a manner that better reflects investors’ interests, and potentially 
eliminate some of the pathologies that have resulted from the new con-
centration of stock ownership among a handful of asset managers. 
II.  MUTUAL FUNDS AND REGULATION OF CONFLICTS 
Mutual funds are shell companies, usually organized as trusts un-
der either Delaware or Massachusetts law, or as corporations under Mar-
yland law.9  They have no operations or functions other than to hold a 
basket of securities under professional management.10  Each fund has a 
board of directors or board of trustees, whose main responsibility is to 
hire and oversee an adviser who directs the fund’s investment strategy 
and oversees its administrative operations.11  Investors buy shares in the 
shell, and thereby indirectly gain exposure to a pro rata share of the secu-
rities held by the fund.12   
A fund is established by a sponsoring firm.  The firm selects the 
initial board of directors, which is then expected to contract with the 
sponsor to provide the fund with the necessary investment advice and 
management services for a fee paid out of fund assets.13  These arrange-
ments are rife with conflict and opportunity for predation; the board 
does not have a meaningful opportunity to select a different investment 
adviser,14 so there can be no serious haggling over fees and the scope of 
                                                 
9 Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Contours: perspectives on mutual funds and private funds, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (William A. Birdthistle & John D. Morley 
eds.) (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming). 
10 Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for 
Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 101, 107 (2009). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. at 101, 106–07 (2009). 
13 See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 93–94 (2010). 
14 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979). 
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services provided.15  Moreover, fund investors are often unsophisticated, 
and may be steered to a particular fund by their brokers, who are com-
pensated by the sponsor out of fund assets.16  All manner of abuse is 
possible, from inflated fees to an investment portfolio designed to ad-
vance the interests of the sponsor rather than the interests of fund inves-
tors.17   
The legal system addresses these conflicts in various ways.  First 
and most importantly, in 1940, Congress passed the Investment Compa-
ny Act of 1940 (ICA)18 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).19  
In addition to imposing numerous requirements on mutual funds regard-
ing, among other things, disclosure,20 diversification,21 liquidity,22 valua-
tion,23 and related-party transactions,24 these statutes and their imple-
menting regulations mandate that the board of each fund include a ma-
jority of “independent” directors, i.e., directors who have no material 
relationship with the sponsoring firm.25  Independent directors have 
                                                 
15 Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Boards: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 161, 169 (2006). 
16 Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2017).  The 
Department of Labor’s controversial fiduciary rule was adopted to address some of 
these concerns.  See Daisy Maxey, Investing in Funds & ETFs: A Quarterly Analysis – The 
ABCs (and T's and Z's) of the Fiduciary Rule, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2017, at R1. 
17 Taub, supra note 10, at 115 (2009). 
18 15 U.S.C. §80a-1 et seq. 
19 15 U.S.C. §80b-1 et seq. 
20 LOIS YUROW ET AL., MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 
§§ 12:2, 27:2 (2017). 
21 John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Fund Regulation, 6 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 341 (2012). 
22 YUROW, supra note 20, at § 16:4. 
23 YUROW, supra note 20, at § 14:1. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f). 
25 The ICA requires only that boards be forty percent independent, see 15 U.S.C. §80a-
10(a), but in 2001, the SEC promulgated a rule requiring that funds seeking certain 
specified regulatory exemptions maintain majority independent boards.  Most funds 
have voluntarily chosen to take advantage of these exemptions.  Thomas A. Bausch et 
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been described as the “cornerstone of the ICA’s effort to control con-
flicts of interest” who serve as “independent watchdogs” to protect the 
interests of fund investors.26  As such, their most important responsibili-
ties are to approve the investment adviser’s contract, including its fee,27 
and to evaluate the quality of the fund’s management.28   
Fund directors and advisors also have fiduciary duties to each 
fund they administer under the ICA and IAA, and the law of the organ-
izing state, namely, the duties of care and loyalty.29  The duty of care re-
quires that the fiduciary “exercise the judgment and care that a prudent 
person would exercise in the management of his or her own affairs.”30  
The duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary “resolve all conflicts of 
interest in favor of the beneficiary and to devote its full energies toward 
enhancing the beneficiary’s interest.”31  Many funds are also offered as 
                                                                                                                   
al., Creating an Effective, Functioning and Legally Compliant Mutual Fund Board, 22 THE IN-
VESTMENT LAWYER 1 (2015); Role of Independent Directors of Investment Compa-
nies, Securities Act Release No. 33-7932 Investment Company Act Rel. No. 24816 (Jan. 
2, 2001).  
26 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482–84 (1979). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c). 
28 See SEC Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 2004). 
29 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006); SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 277 F. 
Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Proxy Voting 
by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting 
Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003); Role of Independent 
Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-7932 Investment 
Company Act Rel. No. 24816 (Jan. 2, 2001); SEC Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 2004). 
30 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER 
COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL 
PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY (Sept. 4, 1980) (printed for the 
use of S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.) [here-
inafter “STAFF REPORT”]. 
31 STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 391.  
2017]                  MUTUAL FUND VOTING AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION                  181 
part of an ERISA-regulated retirement plan, with similar fiduciary obliga-
tions imposed.32   
Yet, despite this extensive regulatory framework, the conflicts 
under which funds labor remain an intractable fact of the industry.  Fee 
structures may be exploitative.33   Sponsors may be part of larger finan-
cial conglomerates, and their interests in promoting other lines of busi-
ness may conflict with fund interests.34   
More fundamentally, most mutual funds exist as part of a family 
or complex of funds, all sponsored by a single asset manager, and each 
with its own investment strategy, such as a focus on achieving particular 
investment goals, or a focus on particular market segments.  Because the 
largest asset managers may offer hundreds of individual funds,35 conflicts 
are pervasive; at every level, the fund adviser must decide how to allocate 
resources.36  As John Morley and Allen Ferrell put it, “Every time a man-
ager assigns an employee to serve one client, decides the order in which 
to execute trades, . . . the manager is facing a conflict of interest.  Even 
the allocation of computer equipment and office space involves a con-
flict among clients.”37  In resolving these conflicts, there is strong evi-
dence that advisers favor some funds over others by, among other 
                                                 
32 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written 
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR 
95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352. 
33 Edwards, supra note 16, at 19–20 (2017); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do 
Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 31 (2016).   
34 For example, asset managers might direct funds to buy shares in offerings by an asso-
ciated underwriter. Taub, supra note 10, at 115–116. 
35 Fichtner et al., supra note 8, at 307 (BlackRock offers over 200 funds); John Morley, 
The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 
123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (Fidelity offers several dozen funds). 
36 Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets:  Intermediaries, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/capital-markets/ferrell-
morley-final_draft.pdf; John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of 
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1263 (2014). 
37 Ferrell & Morley, supra note 36.  
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things, assigning them more portfolio managers,38 hot IPO allocations,39 
or the favorable side of market trades.40  In so doing, sponsors may seek 
to boost funds that charge higher fees.41  Goosing the performance of 
these funds attracts greater investment to them, which more than coun-
terbalances any losses in lower-fee funds.42  Moreover, investors tend to 
gravitate toward particular fund families, creating incentives for sponsors 
to artificially create “star performers” who attract investors’ attention.43 
These conflicts are exacerbated by the nearly universal practice of 
using a single board, or clusters of boards, to oversee all funds in a fami-
ly.44  Though the practice has frequently been challenged on the ground 
that these overboarded directors cannot devote sufficient attention to the 
individual funds whose interests they are obliged to protect—and high 
salaries compromise nominally “independent” directors45—asset manag-
ers have long maintained that funds often face similar issues, and service 
on multiple boards “may actually give directors greater leverage when 
dealing with the common adviser.”46  Both courts and the SEC have ac-
cepted the funds’ position, and have rejected the claim that service on 
multiple boards undermines directors’ independence.47   
                                                 
38 Ilan Guedj & Jannette Papastaikoudi, Can Mutual Fund Families Affect the Performance of 
Their Funds?  
39 Jose-Miguel Gaspar et al., Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-
Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73 (2006). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 76.  
42 Id. at 102. 
43 Id. 
44 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
45 Palmiter, supra note 15; James Sterngold, On Board, at a Mutual Fund, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 3, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-board-at-a-mutual-fund-1409757187; 
James Sterngold, Is Your Fund's Board Watching Out for You?, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2012, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303753904577450243418998540; 
Palmiter, supra note 15.  
46 Investment Company Governance, 69 FR 3472-01, 2004 WL 101604. 
47 See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Intern., Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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At the same time, the SEC is aware of the potential for interfund 
conflict, and has responded with regulations that target specific points of 
concern.48  The landscape is very different when it comes to fund voting, 
however.  In that context, the SEC has been slow to consider conflicts 
between the funds and their sponsors and has been unconcerned with—
and perhaps even encouraged—conflicts among funds managed by a 
single adviser.   
III. MUTUAL FUNDS AND REGULATION OF VOTING 
For many years, mutual fund regulation focused on funds’ fees, 
disclosure practices, and selection of investments, with little attention 
paid to funds’ involvement in the governance of their portfolio compa-
nies.49  Matters began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as 
stock became increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional in-
vestors for the ultimate benefit of other persons, such as retirees and 
employees.  These institutions’ holdings were so large that the traditional 
mechanism for expressing disapproval of management—exit—became 
impractical in many instances; at the same time, the new corporate re-
sponsibility movements, along with the popularity of shareholder pro-
posals, complicated matters on which shareholders were expected to 
vote.50   
In 1980, the SEC staff issued a report on institutional involve-
ment in corporate governance.51  Though the report did not focus on 
mutual funds specifically, it articulated the principle that institutional in-
vestors’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty extended to the exercise of 
the stockholder franchise.52  The staff made clear that institutions had a 
“duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the beneficiar-
                                                 
48 17 C.F.R. 270.17d-1 (2013); 17 C.F.R. 270.17a-7 (2005); 17 C.F.R. 270.10f-3 (2016); 
see also John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Struc-
ture and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (characterizing SEC approach as “ad 
hoc”).  
49 Palmiter, supra note 15. 
50 STAFF REPORT, supra note 30. 
51 Investment Company Governance, 69 FR 3472-01, 2004 WL 101604. 
52 Id. 
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ies,”53 and concluded that “an institutional investor which does not par-
ticipate in the corporate governance process may be taking insufficient 
interest in the financial integrity and performance of its investment.”54  
In the years that followed, the SEC sporadically mentioned fidu-
ciary duties in connection with institutional voting generally, and mutual 
fund voting in particular.55  Finally, in 2003, the SEC promulgated rules 
under the ICA and IAA requiring that funds develop and publicize their 
policies for voting portfolio company shares.56 In the implementing re-
lease, the SEC reiterated that “The duty of care requires an adviser with 
proxy voting authority to monitor corporate events and to vote the prox-
ies. To satisfy its duty of loyalty, the adviser must cast the proxy votes in 
a manner consistent with the best interest of its client and must not sub-
rogate client interests to its own.”57  
During the same period, the Department of Labor (which over-
sees ERISA) also became increasingly concerned about voting of stock 
held in ERISA-regulated benefit plans,58 culminating in a 1994 interpre-
tive bulletin clarifying that the “fiduciary obligations of prudence and 
loyalty . . . require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Paul R. Carey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment 
Company Institute Procedures Conference (Dec. 9, 1999) (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch335.htm); Joann S. Lu-
blin, Proxy Voting Is a Fiduciary Duty, SEC Chief Says in Letter to Group, WALL ST. J. 
(March 21, 2002, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016665892898975640. 
56 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2017); Proxy Voting by In-
vestment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Poli-
cies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 
Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
57 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
58 See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Labor, to 
Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), in 1988 
ERISA LEXIS 19, 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 371, 391 (Feb. 29, 1988) (explaining that “the 
decision[s] as to how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset man-
agement.”); Lublin, supra note 55. 
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may affect the value of the plan’s investment.”59  As a result, plans would 
be expected to include written statements of proxy voting policy in their 
overall investment policies.60   
Both agencies were apparently motivated, at least in part, by con-
cerns that investment advisers were voting shares in their own self-
interest, often to please corporate management that could direct banking 
or pension-related business to the adviser.61  As a result, the SEC rules 
place particular emphasis on conflicts between advisers and funds, re-
quiring advisers to adopt “written policies and procedures that are rea-
sonably designed to ensure” that securities are voted “in the best interest 
of clients” and “address material conflicts that may arise between” the 
interests of the adviser and its clients.62   In comments to the rule, the 
SEC explained further: 
An adviser’s policies and procedures under 
the rule must also address how the adviser 
resolves material conflicts of interest with 
its clients. . . . [W]e believe that an adviser 
that has a material conflict of interest with 
its clients must take other steps designed to 
ensure, and must be able to demonstrate 
that those steps resulted in, a decision to 
vote the proxies that was based on the cli-
ents’ best interest and was not the product 
of the conflict.63  
In adopting its rules, the SEC explicitly stated that advisers may 
avoid conflicts by voting securities in accord with the recommendations 
                                                 
59 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2017). 
60Id.; see also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and 
Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guide-
lines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352 (providing updated guidance). 
61 Lublin, supra note 55; Taub, supra note 10.  
62 17 CFR 275.206(4)-6(a) (2017). 
63 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
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of an independent third party.64  Such third parties, the SEC later ad-
vised, might include certain proxy advisory firms—companies that spe-
cialize in analyzing proxy materials and advising institutions as to how to 
vote their shares to promote long-term value65—so long as the firm was 
properly vetted for its own conflicts. 66   
At the same time, both the SEC and DOL have made clear that 
funds need not cast votes in every election on every issue proposed by 
portfolio companies; instead, advisers should perform a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine whether the effort involved in researching the issue 
exceeds the potential value to the fund of casting an informed vote.67  
That said, the agencies apparently assume that for most issues involving 
publicly traded stock, costs are minimal.  The DOL has been explicit on 
this point, explaining that professionalization of investment management 
and associated economies of scale, as well as reliance on proxy advisory 
firms, will make the voting process in most instances relatively inexpen-
sive.68  Though the SEC has not articulated its views as plainly as the 
DOL, it appears to operate under the same assumption.  Both of the 
SEC’s 2003 releases cited the DOL’s 1994 bulletin,69 and the SEC of-
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889–90 (2007); Mat-
thew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. 
PA. L. REV. 649, 672–73 (2016). 
66 Egan-Jones Proxy Services No-Action Letter (May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov 
/divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704.htm. 
67 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003); 29 
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2017); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder 
Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies 
or Guidelines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352; Paul R. Carey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment Company Institute Procedures Conference 
(Dec. 9, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/speecharchive/1999/spch335.htm). 
68 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written 
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR 
95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352. 
69 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003); Dis-
closure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
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fered the same example as the DOL—voting securities of a foreign 
company—as a scenario in which a vote may not be cost-justified.70  
Moreover, as described above, the SEC, like the DOL, has blessed the 
use of proxy advisory firms. 
Partially in response to the new federal requirements, most asset 
managers have created centralized governance offices that handle the 
voting and engagement functions for all of the funds, or clusters of 
funds, administered by the manager.71  These offices articulate a general 
set of corporate governance preferences that guide all proxy voting 
across the funds.  For example, asset managers might declare a general 
preference for destaggering boards,72 proxy access under certain condi-
tions,73 and opposition to directors who ignore successful shareholder 
proposals.74  As a result, funds administered as part of a single family 
tend to vote their shares as a block.75  In some cases, funds may simply 
                                                                                                                   
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 
47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
70 Compare Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 n. 18 (Feb. 7, 
2003), with 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994), and Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exer-
cise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including 
Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352. 
71 See, e.g., Vanguard, Statement of Additional Information, (April 27, 2017), 
http://www.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf (describing Vanguard’s Proxy Over-
sight Committee); BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship (July 2017), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-be/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-
blackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf (describing Blackrock’s voting pro-
cedures). 
72 BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015), https://www. 
blackrock.com/corporate/en-kr/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-gui-
delines-us.pdf; Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017), https:// 
www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-Proxy-Voting-
Guidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-Advised-by-FMRCo.pdf. 
73 BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015); Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’ 
Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017). 
74 BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015); Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’ 
Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017). 
75 Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript 
at 11–13), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Scott-Hirst-
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outsource their voting function to proxy advisor services, like ISS, and 
vote in accordance with their recommendations.76  Even when votes are 
handled by individual fund portfolio managers—such as transaction-
                                                                                                                   
Social-Responsibility-Resolutions.pdf; Rasha Ashraf et al., Do Pension-Related Business Ties 
Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compen-
sation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 567, 578 (2012) (“In our sample, over 90% of votes 
by fund families exhibit unanimity among the funds within the family.”); Stephen Choi 
et al., Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 35 (2013) (finding it common for large fund families to vote either as a block, or 
in clusters, often traced to common subadvisors); Vanguard, Statement of Additional In-
formation, B-47 (April 27, 2017) http://www.vanguard.com /pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf (“For 
most proxy proposals, particularly those involving corporate governance, the evaluation 
will result in the same position being taken across all of the funds and the funds voting 
as a block,” though with the caveat that some votes may require individuation.); Pal-
miter,  supra note 15 (describing Fidelity and Vanguard); Burton Rothberg & Steven 
Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 157 (2006); Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual 
Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914 (2011); Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? 
Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. 
& POL. 298 (2017); Ying Duan & Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Gov-
ernance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANAL. 489 (2016); Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2013, at BU1 (describing how centralized governance analysts decide how to 
vote fund shares).  There are, of course, exceptions; for example, in the recent proxy 
battle at P&G, some individual BlackRock funds voted differently than the rest of the 
family.  See Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Says Trian’s Nelson Peltz Has Lost Bid 
for Board Seat; He Disagrees, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:57 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/ articles/p-g-board-vote-comes-down-to-the-wire-1507629601. 
76 Choi, supra note 75 (finding that pure reliance on an advisory service is more com-
mon among the smaller families); Duan & Jiao, supra note 75. 
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specific votes on mergers77—funds within a family often coordinate their 
voting.78  
Since the rules were put in place, the SEC has continued to focus 
on potential conflicts of interest between the asset manager and inves-
tors in the fund.  For example, the SEC settled an action against an in-
vestment adviser that voted all of its clients’ shares in accord with AFL-
CIO guidelines in order to win union pension business.79  The SEC has 
also expressed concern about proxy advisory firms that offer conflicted 
advice.80 Yet despite funds’ open practice of centralizing votes, little heed 
has been paid to the potential for interclient conflicts, that is, conflicts be-
tween the interests of different funds.  
                                                 
77 Patrick Jahnke, How Institutional Investors’ Ownership Concentration Affects Corporate Gov-
ernance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, (Sept. 22, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law 
.columbia.edu/2017/09/22/how-institutional-investors-ownership-concentration-
affects-corporate-governance/ (Within fund families, votes on “votes on capital in-
creases or takeovers and other major corporate actions” may be handled by portfolio 
managers; other voting decisions are centralized.); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 
4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing fund managers’ involvement with decisions re-
garding how to respond to a tender offer). 
78 See Andriy Bodnaruk & Marco Rossi, Dual Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers, 
120 J. FIN. ECON. 58 (2016); Hortense Bioy et al., Morningstar Manager Research, Pas-
sive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment Stewardship 11, 14 (Dec. 2017).  
79 In re Intech Inv. Mgmt. LLC & David E. Hurley Respondents, Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940 Release No. IA-2872, 95 SEC Docket 2265, 2009 WL 1271173 (May 7, 
2009). 
80 Egan-Jones Proxy Services No-Action Letter (May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704.htm; Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy 
System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14, 2010).  The 
SEC’s efforts have apparently been only somewhat successful; there is, for example, 
substantial evidence that fund advisers who seek business administering retirement 
plans will vote clients’ shares so as to curry favor with corporate management.  Taub, 
supra note 10; Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual 
Funds, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007); David J. Pedersen, All Tied Up in Knots: The Complex 
Relationship between Bidders and their 401(k) Trustees, (May 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972099; Choi, supra note 75; Ashraf, supra note 75. 
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In the most obvious examples, one fund may hold shares of a 
potential acquiring firm while another holds shares of the target.  The 
funds’ interests are opposed, yet evidence suggests that fund managers 
behave as though all of the funds are part of a single portfolio, and seek 
to maximize wealth across the entire fund family, rather than at a specific 
fund.81  Similarly, when fund families hold both equity and debt of a sin-
gle firm, they may vote the stock with a view to shoring up the value of 
the debt, even if the stock and debt are held by different funds.82  There 
is even evidence that fund families that own stock in competing firms 
prefer compensation packages that reward wealth maximization across 
the industry, without regard for whether particular funds have more or 
less of an interest in specific companies.83   
These practices were on display in the tender offer context in In 
re CNX Gas Corporation.84  One T. Rowe Price fund held shares in both a 
potential acquirer and its target company, while another held shares in 
the target alone.  Despite the funds’ differing interests, T. Rowe Price 
negotiated a price for the target stock on behalf of all of its funds, simul-
taneously.85   
Funds are often asked to vote on governance matters, such as 
destaggering a board or granting proxy access to shareholders.86  Alterna-
                                                 
81 Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers, 
89 J. Fin. Econ. 391 (2008) (analyzing cross-ownership at the conglomerate level); Chris 
Brooks et al., Institutional Cross-ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, (Dec. 21, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2747036 (same); Maria Goranova et al., Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acqui-
sitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership, 31 Strat. Mgmt. J. 1114 (2010) (same).   
82 Bodnaruk & Rossi, supra note 78. 
83 Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (Ross 
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332.   
84 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
85 Id. at 402. 
86 Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, (June 29, 
2017), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/Shareholder-Proposal-
Developments-During-the-2017-Proxy-Season.pdf. 
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tively, they may be asked to support or reject director nominees from a 
dissenting shareholder, typically advocating for immediate cost-cutting 
and a return of cash to shareholders.87  These are matters on which funds 
may reasonably differ, depending on their investment strategies.  Actively 
managed funds with high turnover may prefer immediate financial engi-
neering measures that boost stock prices88; funds that specialize in com-
panies that expect growth, or rely on research and development, may 
prefer to keep antitakeover measures in place.89  But centralized voting 
policies do not draw such distinctions.   
Thus, the issues raised by centralized voting are not limited to the 
usual critique that proxy advisors or institutional investors adopt a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to corporate governance that fails to allow for 
flexibility at individual portfolio companies.90  Though specific compa-
                                                 
87 John C. Coffee, Jr & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activ-
ism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 580–81 (2016). 
88 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
561, 579–80 (2006).  Short-term investors may therefore prefer executive pay packages 
that reward short-term measures over longer term investment.  Cf. Alex Edmans et al., 
The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives, (Oct. 28, 2017), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037354 (describing how CEO incentives 
may induce measures that result in short-term stock price increases at the expense over 
long-term performance).   
89 Robert Daines et al., Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts 
Natural Experiment, (March 2017) http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2836463 (concluding that 
staggered boards contribute to value at earlier-stage firms); Martijn Cremers et al., Stag-
gered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, (July 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2364165 (concluding that staggered boards may add 
value at firms that rely on research and innovation); Martijn Cremers et al., Shadow Pills 
and Long-Term Firm Value, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3074658.  But see Emiliano Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm 
Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value?, (Sept. 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2994559 (concluding that board 
destaggering does not reduce value at firms with high research and development ex-
penditures). 
90 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 906 (2007); Con-
cept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL 
2779423 (July 14, 2010). 
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nies might benefit from idiosyncratic governance approaches, it might 
still be appropriate for funds to adopt general sets of governance prefer-
ences if, on average, those preferences make sense for most companies 
in which it invests, and further company-specific research would not 
yield additional benefits.  The problem, from the perspective of mutual 
fund investors, arises when centralized voting practices fail to draw ap-
propriate distinctions at the fund level. 
In other words, though an institutional investor (or a fund) with 
a variety of holdings might reasonably adopt a uniform set of preferences 
with respect corporate governance, the optimal set of preferences might 
vary from fund to fund depending on its particular investment strategy.  
However, the current practice within fund families is to elide these dif-
ferences through centralized and coordinated voting and engagement.91 
IV.  DOES CENTRALIZED VOTING VIOLATE FUNDS’ DUTIES TO 
 INVESTORS? 
A. Fiduciary Obligations and Conflicts of Duty 
Under traditional common law, from which federal standards are 
drawn,92 fiduciaries are prohibited not only from acting out of self-
interest, but also from even accepting engagements from persons whose 
interests conflict.93  As the Restatement (Second) of Agency puts it, “an agent 
is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his 
agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in 
                                                 
91 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge 
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1913–14 
(2017) (indexed funds and active funds may vote identically within a complex). But see 
Choi, supra note 75 (pointing out that within the Fidelity family of mutual funds, active 
funds and indexed funds are managed separately, and do not vote together).   
92 Staff Report; Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Structure of Investment Management Regulation, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle, 
eds.) (Elgar Publishing, forthcoming); see also Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 
(2010) (interpreting federal duties of mutual fund directors in light of trust principles). 
93 Andrew F. Tuch, The Weakening of Fiduciary Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MU-
TUAL FUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle, eds.) (Elgar Publishing, forth-
coming); Arthur R. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 75, 81 (2005).   
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matters in which the agent is employed.”94  In modern financial con-
glomerates, however—including the mutual fund industry—this rule has 
long been abandoned.95  Courts instead have endorsed the practice of 
partitioning, allowing businesses to serve clients with competing interests 
so long as there are informational and other barriers among the agents 
who handle those accounts.96  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency no longer contains the blanket prohibition of 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 
Still, the Restatement (Third) of Agency continues to forbid agents 
from “us[ing] the property of the principal for . . . [the purposes] of a 
third party.”97  Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts requires that trus-
tees not “be influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives 
other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust” in adminis-
tering trust assets.98  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts does recognize that, 
in some instances, a trust has multiple beneficiaries, necessitating that the 
trustee balance their competing interests (while displaying impartiality 
among them).99  Such a situation might be analogized to the types of re-
source-based conflicts encountered by fund sponsors who must decide 
how to allocate personnel and scarce opportunities among funds (recog-
nizing that these conflicts exist because sponsors voluntarily assume con-
flicting obligations, which would be forbidden under traditional princi-
ples).100  Voting, however, is not like these other conflicts, because it is 
not a limited resource; centralization, let alone the use of one fund’s 
votes to benefit holdings in another fund, is not an inescapable aspect of 
the business model.  Thus, an application of these principles would bar 
                                                 
94 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394. 
95 Tuch, supra note 93. 
96 Id.  
97 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.05. 
98 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. f.; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency       
§ 8.05 cmt. b (trustees must exhibit “undivided loyalty” to beneficiaries, and act “solely 
in the interest of the beneficiary in matters of trust administration”). 
99 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 cmt. c. 
100 Laby, supra note 93, at 92–93.   
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advisers from using the votes of one fund to enhance the value of a dif-
ferent fund.101   
Moreover, the duty of care requires that advisers “exercise the 
judgment and care that a prudent person would exercise in the manage-
ment of his or her own affairs.”102  Centralization may result from a kind 
of short-cut on governance matters that may not satisfy the needs of par-
ticular funds; that practice, as well, would seem to violate asset managers’ 
duties to the funds they sponsor.103 
But matters are not quite so straightforward.   
First, from a regulatory standpoint, both the SEC and the DOL 
have appeared to approve, if not encourage, centralized voting in general, 
and outsourcing to proxy advisory services in particular.  The SEC has 
explained that the use of a “pre-determined voting policy” or the “rec-
ommendations of an independent third party” are permissible mecha-
nisms for avoiding conflicts between an adviser and its client.104  To be 
sure, these policies and recommendations could be fund-specific—as the 
SEC put it, “[n]othing in the rule prevents an adviser from having differ-
                                                 
101 Mutual funds organized as trusts differ from ordinary trusts, in that they have no 
donor/settlor and thus are more contractual.  See Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. v. 
Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015).  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
has held that traditional trust law provides the most appropriate analogy.  See Jones v. 
Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010). See also Tuch, supra note 93 (investment advis-
ers are subject to fiduciary duties of the common law of trusts); Palmiter, supra note 15, 
at 1466 (same).  
102 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 (“The trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to 
invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the 
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust”). 
103 For example, passive investment managers that control funds with holdings of both 
an acquirer and target may simply vote all target shares in favor of a merger, and all 
acquirer shares against the merger, ignoring the needs of particular funds.  As the cur-
rent Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, put it, “This is, of 
course, incoherent, stupid, and reflective of a lack of judgment being exercised by the 
index fund on behalf of its specific investors and their interests.”  Leo E. Strine, J., Se-
curing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term 
Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. L. 1081, 1093 (2016). 
104 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
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ent policies and procedures for different clients”105—but that phrasing 
itself suggests something of a one-size-fits-all default. 
Additionally, both the SEC and the DOL have stressed that 
funds need not vote their shares if the costs of researching an issue out-
weigh the benefits to the fund of voting.  Since each individual fund may 
only benefit from its votes to a very small degree, many votes are unlike-
ly to be cost-justified without centralization.106  This point was acknowl-
edged by the DOL which, as described above, explicitly stated that the 
professionalization of investment advice, coupled with the use of proxy 
advisor services, renders voting inexpensive enough to justify the cost.   
The SEC has also emphasized the positive externalities associat-
ed with careful voting by mutual funds due to their “increased equity 
holdings and accompanying voting power.”  That voting power, accord-
ing to the SEC, “place[s] them in a position to have enormous influence 
on corporate accountability. As major shareholders, mutual funds may 
play a vital role in monitoring the stewardship of the companies in which 
they invest.”107  But this voting power is only present when an asset 
manager like BlackRock or Fidelity votes its funds in a uniform manner; 
viewed fund-by-fund, each institution is far less powerful and far less 
likely to individually assert much of an influence on governance.  Thus, 
in this passage, the SEC once again implicitly assumes that fund shares 
will be voted en masse. 
In sum, the SEC has sent somewhat mixed messages.  Despite 
generally endorsing broad common law standards of fiduciary conduct, 
in practice, the SEC appears to tolerate something quite different. 
 
 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Owner-
ship, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1830–32 (2011).  
107 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Man-
agement Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 8188, 2003 
WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
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B. The Role of Consent 
These conflicting signals might be reconciled if we view funds’ 
voting arrangements through the lens of consent.  In general, both 
common law and the federal regulatory scheme permit clients to consent 
to managerial conflicts upon full disclosure.  For example, the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency permits an agent to act for more than one principal so 
long as the agent deals in good faith and discloses all relevant facts.108  
Similarly, the SEC has stated that “an adviser’s policy of disclosing [any] 
conflict to clients and obtaining their consents before voting satisfies the 
requirements of the rule.”109  In the context of mutual funds, we may 
reasonably question whether retail investors can provide autonomous 
consent, but there is an alternative: the SEC has stated that the directors 
are empowered to consent to actions that might otherwise present a con-
flict.110    
There are certainly plausible reasons for why a mutual fund 
board might consent to centralization of voting policies, despite the con-
flicts they present.  By coordinating votes across funds, fund families in-
crease their leverage with portfolio companies, thus enabling them to 
more effectively advocate for better governance.111  This kind of cooper-
ation among funds may ultimately represent the most profitable ar-
rangement for investors, even if each fund occasionally makes small sac-
rifices on individual matters.  Funds may also share the view that a single 
set of governance policies broadly suit the market as a whole, even if 
they are suboptimal in particular cases, and that therefore it benefits all 
of the funds to seek market-wide standardization.  Standardization may 
also carry its own benefits, by permitting investors to focus on the sub-
stance of businesses when evaluating firms, sparing them the need to 
investigate and price varying governance arrangements. The resulting 
                                                 
108 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06. 
109 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) 
110 Id. at n.20. 
111 Palmiter, supra note 15, at 1465. 
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reduced transaction costs and increased liquidity may counterbalance any 
efficiency losses at outlier firms.112 
The difficulty is that this hypothetical consent remains just that. 
Though we may assume that fund directors are aware of—and perhaps 
have acquiesced—to the sponsor’s publicly announced approach to gov-
ernance issues, it is not obvious that every board has evaluated central-
ized voting strategy with the “high degree of rigor and skeptical objec-
tivity”113 that their role demands. Though both the full board, and the 
independent directors, are required to conduct an annual review of their 
advisory contracts,114 typically the focus of these reviews is on such mat-
ters as the fund’s financial performance, the size of the fee and the advis-
er’s profits, and adviser conflicts of interests115; there is little reason to 
believe much attention is paid to problems created by voting coordina-
tion specifically.116   
V.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 If fund boards and investment advisers are, in fact, neglecting 
their fiduciary duties by centralizing their voting and engagement without 
appropriate consideration, fund investors might seek to remedy the situa-
                                                 
112 Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 
757, 762 (1995); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 619 (2016). 
113 Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 
83 SEC Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accounta-
bility, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 798 (2001)). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15. 
115 ABA Business Law Section, Fund Director’s Guidebook 45 (4th ed. 2015). 
116 The ABA Fund Director’s Guidebook does not even mention proxy voting policy as an 
aspect of board review.  See id. at 45–51; see also id. at 69–94 (describing director over-
sight responsibilities; no mention of voting policy). Cf. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, 
Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 
120 Yale L.J. 84, 95 (2010) (observing that advisory contracts “are generally only two or 
three pages long and specify very little about strategy”).  Significantly, Alan Palmiter, 
writing in 2002—before the SEC promulgated its proxy voting rules—also observed 
that the then-current edition of the ABA Fund Director Guidebook did not discuss 
voting policy.  See Palmiter, supra note 15, at 1466.   
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tion by filing lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty.  However, sharehold-
ers’ private rights of action in the mutual fund context are quite lim-
ited.117  Moreover, it would be difficult if not impossible for investors to 
establish any concrete, tangible damages to the fund as a result of its vot-
ing policy; the most appropriate remedy would be an injunction directing 
fund boards and investment advisers to reform their voting practices.  
Given the widespread practice of voting centralization, and the SEC’s 
expertise in developing industry-wide rules, a more promising path for-
ward would be for the SEC to undertake a rulemaking that more precise-
ly specifies the duties of the board and the investment advisor.  Below, I 
outline how the SEC might approach that task. 
Ordinarily, the SEC requires that contracts between funds that 
share an investment adviser be in the best interests of both parties.  For 
example, according to the SEC, the duty of loyalty requires that “an in-
vestment adviser . . . not cause funds to enter into a 17a-7 transaction 
unless doing so would be in the best interests of each fund participating in the 
transaction.”118  When it comes to mutual fund voting, however, such 
strict equivalence may not be feasible; funds may reasonably cooperate 
by casting votes reciprocally.     
A more appropriate comparison might be drawn to joint distri-
bution arrangements.  Sponsors often use mutual funds’ own assets to 
market shares to new investors, in a practice that is permitted—but regu-
                                                 
117 Investors might bring claims under state law. See Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162 
(2d Cir. 2002). Alternatively, federal law offers a limited right of action for excessive 
fees, see Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010), or to void contracts whose 
formation or performance violates the Investment Advisers Act. See Transamerica 
Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).  Frequently such actions must be 
brought derivatively, with all of the procedural barriers that follow. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, 
Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1025–26 
(2005). 
118 Federated Municipal Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 3421853 (Nov. 20, 
2006) (emphasis added).  Similarly, when funds purchase joint liability insurance, the 
directors of each fund must determine that the contract is in its best interests.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(d)(7).  
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lated by—the SEC.119 Though the SEC prohibits affiliated funds from 
coordinating their marketing in a single plan,120 sponsors may apply for 
relief from the restriction on a case-by-case basis.121  In considering a 
proposed plan, the SEC does not require “absolute equality among the 
participants” or a precise apportionment of costs relative to the benefits 
for each fund,122 but does require that each fund board make an individ-
ualized, fund-specific determination that the arrangement falls within a 
“reasonable range of fairness” that will redound to the fund’s benefit.123  
In so concluding, the board may consider intangible benefits to the fund, 
such as those that flow from economies of scale, and that arise from en-
hancing the attractiveness of the fund complex as a whole.124  At one 
point, the SEC even considered adopting a formal rule that would permit 
joint distribution arrangements so long as the plan was approved by in-
dependent directors who concluded that the plan both benefitted the 
fund, and did not place it at a disadvantage relative to other participating 
funds.125 
                                                 
119 17 C.F.R. 270.12b-1. 
120 17 C.F.R. 270.17d-3.   
121  Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, SEC Proposed Rule, 2010 WL 
11248712 (July 21, 2010) (“any joint arrangement between funds that implicates section 
17(d) and rule 17d-1 would require the funds to apply for and obtain an exemption 
from the Commission prior to implementing the arrangement”). 
122 In re Vanguard Group, Investment Company Act Release No. 11645, 1981 WL 
749192 (Feb. 25, 2981). 
123 Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management Invest-
ment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824 
(June 10, 1988),. 
124 See In re Vanguard Group, Investment Company Act Release No. 11645, 1981 WL 
749192 (Feb. 25, 2981); Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 
1988 WL 1706824 (June 10, 1988). 
125 See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management In-
vestment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824 
(June 10, 1988). 
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Centralized voting policies could follow a similar model.  Inde-
pendent directors would be expected to scrutinize such arrangements, 
and make fund-by-fund determinations whether, based on the fund’s 
investment strategy as compared to the governance preferences ex-
pressed by the sponsor, participating in the arrangement would be in the 
fund’s best interests.  If they conclude that the fund’s interests differ 
from those of other funds in the complex, they should insist that the 
fund vote its shares independently. 
Consent to a conflict, however, is only effective if “it is specific 
and is given with knowledge of material facts.”126  In the context of joint 
distribution arrangements, for example, the SEC’s proposed rule would 
only have granted blanket permission if the specifics of the arrangement 
were detailed in advance, presumably so that each fund board would be 
fully informed.127  When it comes to voting and engagement, fund boards 
may be aware of the “material facts” with respect to generalized corpo-
rate governance policies, but they would need transaction-specific infor-
mation to consent to coordinated voting and engagement on issues like 
mergers or company-specific resolutions.  Presumably, the benefits and 
drawbacks of centralization on these types of votes are dependent on the 
particular factors involved, including an assessment of whether the fund 
is sacrificing more—in lost merger compensation, from lack of vigorous 
competition—than it is gaining through cooperation with sibling funds.  
Thus, for these matters, informed consent might require case-by-case 
board consideration. 
In an alternative model, asset managers might alter their structure 
so that governance research is centralized, but actual voting determina-
                                                 
126 Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 269, 282 (2015); see also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6585, n.21 (Feb. 7, 2003) (“An adviser seeking a client’s consent must provide the client 
with sufficient information regarding the matter before shareholders and the nature of 
the adviser’s conflict to enable the client to make an informed decision to consent to 
the adviser’s vote. Boilerplate disclosure in a client brochure regarding generalized con-
flicts would be inadequate.”). 
127 See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management In-
vestment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824 
(June 10, 1988). 
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tions are made at the fund level.  That way, the family might avoid costly 
and duplicative determinations regarding the likely effects/outcomes of 
particular proposals, while allowing each fund to judge for itself what 
policies are likely to benefit that particular fund.  To the extent that the 
actual voting decisions are not made by the board, but by portfolio man-
agers—who are more informed than directors, but also employed by and 
beholden to the sponsoring company—procedures akin to those used 
for cross-client trades might be appropriate.  Voting decisions and analy-
sis could be documented, along with a description of how the votes im-
pacted other related funds, and presented to each board on a quarterly 
basis for its review and approval by the independent directors.128  
Certainly, these proposals are far from ideal.  One major issue 
concerns the heavy reliance placed on fund independent directors.  As 
described above, even statutorily independent directors may serve on 
tens or hundreds of boards within a complex, raising questions about 
both their loyalties and their attention.  However, nominally independent 
boards are central to the entire system of mutual fund compliance129; if 
they are inadequate to the task, the issues go far beyond voting policy. 
More fundamentally, these procedures would come with a price.  
Additional demands on the time and attention of fund boards might ul-
timately increase costs to the funds themselves, even to the point where 
the votes would no longer be cost-justified.130  If so, then, as the SEC has 
acknowledged, the prudent course may be for funds not to vote at all.  
This alternative, however, would be better for fund investors than for 
                                                 
128 Compare 17 CFR 270.17a-7, with 17 CFR 275.206(3)-2, and SEC Staff No Action Let-
ter to Independent Directors Council (Nov. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov 
/divisions/investment/noaction/2010/idc-mfdf110210.pdf (requiring that boards con-
duct quarterly reviews of affiliated transactions; boards may “tap …relevant expertise” 
to assist with the effort, including counsel and fund personnel). 
129 See Palmiter, supra note 15; Morley & Curtis, supra note 13. 
130 Costs may be justified for some funds in the complex, but not others.  Active funds, 
for example, may collect more information about the securities they trade than passive 
funds, making it easier for directors of those funds to make informed decisions about 
voting policy.  Cf. Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting 
(forthcoming in Journal of Corporation Law), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992046. 
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funds to cast suboptimal votes to shore up other funds—particularly as 
there will always be concerns that the ultimate beneficiaries of such votes 
will be funds that charge higher fees and thus generate more profits for 
the sponsor. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Though the SEC has exhibited concern about investment advis-
ers who use fund votes as currency to advance their own interests, it has 
paid less attention to the problems of interfund conflict.  As a result, 
there is reason to believe that fund managers do not seek to maximize 
value at particular funds, but instead seek to maximize value across the 
entire fund complex.  Though this might be a reasonable choice that 
benefits investors, it is not clear that the matter has received serious con-
sideration.  Whether due to regulation or on their own initiative, fund 
boards should make reasoned choices about the extent to which particu-
lar funds benefit from participating in a cooperative voting scheme with 
their sibling funds. 
More focused attention to conflicts in voting policy—both at the 
regulatory level, and the fund board level—may also have a salutary ef-
fect on portfolio company management.  In recent years, scholars have 
raised concerns that mutual funds’ voting power distorts corporate poli-
cy.  For example, mutual fund managers may pressure portfolio compa-
nies to achieve short-term stock price boosts at the expense of invest-
ments that would yield longer-term gains.131  Index fund managers may 
be relatively uninformed about portfolio companies and make poor gov-
ernance decisions when voting or engaging with management.132  In one 
of the more explosive charges, it has been suggested that because fund 
families hold stock in multiple competing firms across their portfolios, 
they may encourage firms within an industry to cooperate with each oth-
er rather than compete, potentially running afoul of the spirit, and possi-
bly the letter, of antitrust laws.133  These and many other concerns about 
                                                 
131 See David Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections on a Scholarly Ca-
reer, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 729 (2017). 
132 See Shapiro Lund, supra note 130.  
133 See José Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427345; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 
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the power of mutual funds have led to a variety of proposals for dra-
matic corporate governance reforms, including eliminating voting rights 
for passive investors,134 and regulating the investment policies of mutual 
fund families.135  Assuming these scholars are correct, the premise of the 
argument is that fund families act as a block.  If a more precise articula-
tion of fiduciary duties forced less coordination within the family itself, 
some of these concerns might be alleviated, without the need for up-
heavals of other aspects of the corporate legal regime.   
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